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GOOD INTENTIONS, UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES: HOW UNITED STATES V. 
JAMES WILL AFFECT FEDERAL SEXUAL ABUSE 
ANALYSIS 
Kelsey Wong* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cerebral palsy is a group of disorders that affects a person’s 
ability to move.1 Although the symptoms of cerebral palsy vary, all 
individuals with cerebral palsy experience some degree of movement 
and posture impairments, and many have related conditions, 
including intellectual disability.2 Most individuals with cerebral 
palsy, however, are capable of communicating.3 Those who are 
unable to speak or who do not have total control over their body 
movements often communicate through established non-verbal 
methods, including text-to-speech or eye tracking technology, voice 
synthesizers, or sign language.4 
In United States v. James,5 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
evidence presented6 was sufficient to establish that T.C., a twenty-
eight year old woman with cerebral palsy, was physically incapable 
of communicating her unwillingness to engage in a sexual act with 
the defendant, Christopher James (“James”).7 The case turned on the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding, which broadly interpreted the statutory 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Communication & 
Political Science, June 2012, University of California San Diego. Thank you to Professor Sean 
Kennedy, whose guidance and expertise made this Comment possible and to the editors and staff 
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their meticulous edits. Finally, thank you to my 
family and friends for their endless support and encouragement.  
 1. Facts About Cerebral Palsy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www. 
cdc.gov/ncbddd/cp/facts.html (last updated July 13, 2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Communication, MYCHILD, http://www.cerebralpalsy.org/information/communication 
(last visited July 23, 2016). 
 4. Id. 
 5. 810 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. James, 810 F.3d at 681–82. 
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phrase—“physically incapable” of communicating an unwillingness 
to engage in a sexual act.8 The interpretation of this language in 18 
U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) (“§ 2242(2)(B)”),9 the federal non-aggravated 
sexual abuse statute,10 was a matter of first impression for the Ninth 
Circuit.11 In its opinion, the circuit court expressly declined to follow 
guidance from states that had interpreted similar language in their 
respective rape statutes.12 
The majority asserted in the last paragraph of their opinion, 
perhaps as a parting thought, that “[t]he law in its majesty protects 
from assault those who are too weak and feeble to protect 
themselves.”13 That phrase is revealing of the majority’s focus and 
attention throughout its opinion. While that theory appears as a noble 
approach to the law on its surface, the circuit court’s holding, in 
effect, reinforces a paternalistic view of the law and unreasonably 
broadens the statute’s meaning beyond what Congress likely 
intended. 
Certainly, statutory laws must protect victims of sexual abuse.14 
But James’s holding may lead to vast and unanticipated 
consequences for alleged violators of § 2242(2)(B) in future cases. 
The majority’s broadened interpretation of the statute—finding that a 
defendant can be convicted under § 2242(2)(B), even when the 
 
 8. Id. at 682. 
 9. Section 2242(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code states in full: 
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a 
Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in 
custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any 
Federal department or agency, knowingly— 
(2)   engages in a sexual act with another person if that other person is— 
(A)   incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or 
(B)   physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating 
unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) (2012). 
 10. See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5414 (Supp. 2016) 
(noting that an example of a non-aggravated act of sexual abuse is where one person takes 
advantage of a person who is mentally or physically unable to consent to the sexual act). 
 11. James, 810 F.3d at 676. 
 12. Id. at 680–81 (rejecting the narrower “physically helpless” standard employed by 
Connecticut and New York courts in favor of a broader “physically incapable” standard). 
 13. Id. at 683. 
 14. One of Congress’s intentions in enacting the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986 was to expand 
the offense to reach all forms of sexual abuse, thereby further developing statutory avenues for 
victims of sexual crimes. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-594, at 10–11 (1986), http://files.eric.ed.gov/ 
fulltext/ED274931.pdf. 
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victim had some awareness of the situation15—has potentially 
dangerous consequences. First, because the federal government and 
not the State of Arizona has jurisdiction over sexual assault crimes in 
Indian Country,16 this holding furthers an imbalance of federal and 
state law standards for sexual assault crimes that Congress had 
attempted to eliminate when it enacted the statute.17 The majority 
seems to forget or to resist Congress’s intent in evening the 
imbalance between federal and state laws when it specifically put 
forth its reasoning in distinguishing its interpretation of the federal 
“physically incapable” standard from the “physically helpless” state 
standard equivalent.18 
Further, the majority’s holding upends the well-established rule 
of lenity, which requires courts to resolve ambiguities in criminal 
statutes in favor of the defendant.19 The rationale behind the rule of 
lenity is twofold: first, the criminal defendant should be given a fair 
warning that his or her conduct would violate the statute in question, 
and second, because of the seriousness of criminal punishment, the 
legislature—not the courts—should define criminal activity.20 
Lastly, the practical effect of the James holding is that it may 
affect social policy, specifically for the disabled community, by 
 
 15. The majority cited other federal cases upholding the defendant’s conviction under 
§ 2242(2)(B) in instances where the victim was “physically hampered” due to sleep, intoxication, 
or drug use and, therefore, was rendered physically incapable of communicating unwillingness to 
engage in the sexual act. James, 810 F.3d at 681; see, e.g., United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 1017, 
1028 (8th Cir. 2005) (ruling that victim was physically incapable where the lingering effects of 
marijuana may have hindered her ability to object to the abuse); United States v. Morgan, 164 
F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding defendant’s conviction where the victim repeatedly 
gained and lost consciousness as an effect of alcohol); United States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d 1346, 
1348 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding conviction where victim, though not fully awake, vaguely 
remembered someone pulling off her underwear). 
 16. The “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States in § 2242 includes 
Indian Country. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 17. “Members of Congress worried that antiquated federal laws and modernized state laws 
criminalized different conduct, an imbalance of particular concern in Indian country.” United 
States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754, 772 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that the genesis of the Sexual Abuse 
Act of 1986 was Congress’s recognition that federal law was becoming increasingly inconsistent 
with state law). See Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 87, 100 Stat. 3592, 3620–
24 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–44, 2246 (2007)). 
 18. The majority stated that federal law should not be dependent on state law here because 
state law punishes non-consensual sexual intercourse; in contrast, federal law does not have this 
language’s counterpart in its statute. James, 810 F.3d at 679. The majority also stated that the 
state law phrase ‘physically helpless’ was too narrow to cover instances where a victim may be 
merely physically incapacitated. Id. at 681. 
 19. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
 20. Id. at 347–48; see James, 810 F.3d at 684 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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deepening existing stereotypes of disabled individuals, failing to 
differentiate between the wide spectrum of abilities amongst disabled 
persons, and stifling sexual encounters between non-disabled and 
disabled individuals.21 
It is the position of this Comment that the majority’s holding in 
James was an example of improper judicial activism and judicial 
overreach. Part II sets forth the factual background of the case. Part 
III takes an in-depth look at both the district court’s and the Ninth 
Circuit majority’s reasoning behind their differing interpretations of 
§ 2242(2)(B). Part IV analyzes the significance of the majority’s 
holding and illustrates, procedurally, the importance of the criminal 
charge and of the principles of statutory interpretation in the 
American criminal justice system. Part IV also provides important 
policy reasons why the majority missed the bigger picture underlying 
the realistic implications of its holding. Part V examines the impact 
of this case on the disabled community. Finally, Part VI concludes 
by predicting the significance of this holding on future federal sexual 
abuse cases. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
On August 23, 2011, T.C.’s aunt found James and T.C., a then 
twenty-eight year old adult woman with cerebral palsy, having sex 
on the porch of T.C.’s grandparents’ home.22 The incident occurred 
within the boundaries of the Fort Apache Reservation in Indian 
Country.23 T.C.’s aunt rushed T.C. to the hospital, where a vaginal 
examination revealed torn tissue and bleeding from a laceration.24 
James later admitted to investigators from the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (“BIA”) that he had sex with T.C.25 James confessed he had 
removed T.C. from her wheelchair, pulled off her pants and 
underpants and his own pants, and penetrated her digitally and with 
his penis.26 In a statement, James wrote: “I’m ashamed and confusted 
[sic]. I don’t know what made me do what I did . . . . I will not 
 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. T.C. is also James’s niece. James, 810 F.3d at 677. 
 23. Id. The federal government had jurisdiction to indict James because the State of Arizona 
did not have jurisdiction over sexual assault crimes committed in Indian Country. Id. (citing 
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 946 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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forgive me [sic] but I do ask God for forgiveness. [T.C.] is not to 
bleame [sic] either. She was incent [sic] of all things.”27 
T.C. suffers from severe developmental disabilities as a 
condition of her cerebral palsy.28 She has noticeable physical 
limitations and uses a wheelchair.29 She is incapable of walking 
without assistance, must be lifted in and out of her wheelchair, and 
cannot use her hands or upper body.30 
T.C. primarily communicates nonverbally by using gestures and 
sounds.31 Importantly, however, T.C. is capable of verbalizing yes 
and no.32 Though T.C.’s longtime caregiver occasionally had trouble 
understanding T.C., the caregiver nevertheless testified at trial, 
“[S]he can say short phrases, two or three words.”33 The caregiver 
also testified that T.C. is able to communicate her needs and desires, 
such as when she needs to go to the bathroom, when she wants to do 
something, or when she does not want to do something.34 Further, the 
BIA agent who interviewed T.C. after the incident testified that T.C. 
responded to his questions by nodding her head for yes and shaking 
her head for no.35 Also, T.C.’s uncle testified that T.C. gives a mean 
look and growls if the television station is changed against her will.36 
After James confessed, the government charged him with two 
counts of sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B), the 
subsection regarding physical incapacity.37 For unknown reasons, the 
government declined to charge James under § 2242(2)(A), the 
subsection addressing a victim’s mental capacity.38 The government 
also did not offer expert witness testimony to establish T.C.’s 
cognitive impairments; rather, the government relied solely on the 
lay opinion testimony of her family, the emergency room nurse, her 
caregiver, and the BIA agent to establish the level of T.C.’s cognitive 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 676–77. 
 29. Id. at 676. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 676–77; see Transcript of Proceedings at 13:10–11, United States v. James, 2013 
WL 5423979 (No. 11-8206) [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings]. 
 32. The government’s counsel stated this in her opening statement. Transcript of 
Proceedings, supra note 31, at 13:11; see James, 810 F.3d at 677. 
 33. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 31, at 13:10–16. 
 34. James, 810 F.3d at 685 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See supra note 9 for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) in its entirety. 
 38. James, 810 F.3d at 677. 
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awareness.39 
On July 30, 2013, a three-day jury trial commenced.40 James 
moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s 
case and, again, at the close of trial.41 The district court reserved its 
ruling on both motions until it heard the jury’s verdict.42 The jury 
convicted James on both counts.43 After oral arguments and post-trial 
briefing, the judge granted James’s motion for acquittal, and 
Judgment of Acquittal was entered on September 26, 2013.44 The 
government timely appealed.45 
III.  THE REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  The District Court’s Reasoning 
In assessing whether to grant the defense’s motion for acquittal, 
the district court first looked to interpret the meaning of “physically 
incapable” under § 2242(2)(B).46 
The district court began by analyzing the legislature’s intent in 
drafting the statute.47 Congress enacted § 2242(2)(B) as part of the 
Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, which was a step towards modernizing 
and reforming the federal rape statutes.48 The House Judiciary 
Committee explicitly defined all of the elements of each offense 
under § 2242, but did not elaborate on the definition or meaning of 
“physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating 
unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act” under subsection (B).49 
Since the district court did not find, and the parties did not cite, 
any federal cases that clarified the meaning of “physically 
incapable,” the district court turned to state courts that had 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 678. Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that “the court on 
the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment for acquittal of any offense for which the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. 
 42. James, 810 F.3d at 678. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.; see United States v. James, No. CR-11-8206, 2013 WL 5423979, at *1 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 26, 2013), rev’d and vacated, 810 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 45. James, 810 F.3d at 678. 
 46. James, 2013 WL 5423979, at *2. 
 47. James, 810 F.3d at 678. 
 48. See supra note 14; see Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 87, 100 Stat. 
3592, 3620–24 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–44, 2246 (2007)). 
 49. James, 2013 WL 5423979, at *3. 
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interpreted similar language in their own respective rape statutes for 
guidance.50 In State v. Fourtin,51 the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
held that the state rape statute criminalized sexual intercourse with a 
person who was “physically helpless” at the time of the sexual 
intercourse.52 There, the court defined a “physically helpless” person 
as one who was “unconscious,” or for any other reason, was 
“physically helpless” at the time of sexual intercourse.53 The Fourtin 
court ultimately concluded that the State of Connecticut had 
presented sufficient evidence to show that the victim was capable of 
communicating and that the state did not produce adequate evidence 
that the victim “was either so unconscious or so uncommunicative 
that she was physically incapable of manifesting . . . her lack of 
consent . . . .”54 
Similarly, the district court found additional support in People v. 
Huurre.55 In Huurre, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a 
lower court’s determination that a nonverbal woman with cerebral 
palsy and epilepsy was not physically helpless within the meaning of 
the New York state statute, which is equivalent to Connecticut’s rape 
statute.56 
Ultimately, through its analysis of the statute’s legislative 
history and other jurisdictions’ judicial interpretations of similar 
statutes, the district court concluded that a person who is able to 
communicate unwillingness by vocalizations, gestures, or other 
actions does not meet the “physically incapable” standard under § 
2242(2)(B), even if the person cannot physically resist or lacks 
mental capacity to perceive.57 For this reason, the district court held 
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain James’s 
conviction under § 2242(2)(B) in this case58 and, therefore, granted 
 
 50. See id. at *3–4. 
 51. 52 A.3d 674 (Conn. 2012). 
 52. Id. at 676. 
 53. Id. The issue in Fourtin was whether the victim, a woman with cerebral palsy, mental 
retardation, and hydrocephalus, had the physical ability to communicate unwillingness. The 
evidence presented at trial showed that the victim was nonverbal, but that she was able to 
communicate by gesturing, vocalizing, and using a communication board. Further, the victim was 
able to indicate her feelings by groaning, screeching, kicking, biting, and scratching. Id. at 677. 
 54. Id. at 690. 
 55. 603 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 1993). 
 56. Id. at 180; see James, 2013 WL 5423979, at *4. 
 57. James, 2013 WL 5423979, at *6. 
 58. Id. at *7. 
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James’s motion for acquittal.59 
B.  The Ninth Circuit Majority’s Reasoning 
Reviewing the lower court’s decision to grant James’s motion 
for acquittal under a de novo standard, Circuit Judge Richard 
Tallman, writing for the majority, held that as a matter of first 
impression, “physically incapable,” as used in § 2242(2)(B), was to 
be defined broadly.60 The majority’s holding expressly rejected the 
district court’s interpretation, which defined “physically incapable” 
in a manner similar to the “physically helpless” state standard 
equivalent.61 The majority instead found that the two standards were 
separate and distinct.62 The majority also disagreed with the district 
court’s reasoning, which essentially required T.C. to be totally and 
completely helpless in order for the jury to properly convict James 
under § 2242(2)(B).63 
To support its reasoning, the majority cited the manner in which 
§ 2242(2)(B) had been applied in other federal cases.64 Although 
there was no case law that applied § 2242(2)(B) to a victim with 
cerebral palsy, the court reasoned that other federal courts’ 
interpretation of the same subsection aligned with its conclusion that 
a defendant may be convicted under § 2242(2)(B) where the victim 
had some awareness of the situation, like T.C. did in this case.65 
Even though the victim may not have been completely physically 
helpless, the majority concluded that a physically “hampered” victim 
 
 59. Id. at *8. The district court found that, with the evidence presented at trial, the jury could 
not find beyond a reasonable doubt that T.C. was “physically incapable of declining participation 
in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act” at the time of the alleged sexual 
act. Id. at *7. 
 60. United States v. James, 810 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 681. The Ninth Circuit majority stated: 
“Physically helpless” suggests a lack of physical ability to do anything while 
“physically incapable” is a term that is more susceptible to application to various 
factual situations that can come before a jury. A victim could have a physical 
incapacity to decline participation or be incapable of communicating unwillingness to 
engage in a sexual act and still not be physically helpless. 
Id. 
 63. Id. at 682. 
 64. Id. at 681; see United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 1017, 1028 (8th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., 
United States v. Morgan, 164 F.3d. 1235, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 1999) (in the sentencing stage, the 
court held the defendant violated § 2242 where the victim repeatedly gained and lost 
consciousness and “was unconscious or nearly so” at the time of intercourse).   
 65. James, 810 F.3d at 679–81. 
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would be classified as “physically incapable” under the statute.66 To 
further support its position, the majority noted that federal law did 
not have a provision criminalizing non-consensual sexual 
intercourse, like many state statutes had incorporated into its laws.67 
The court’s holding, which broadens the meaning of § 2242(2)(B), 
however, fills that noticeable gap in federal law, although the 
absence of non-consensual sexual intercourse in the federal statute 
may have been what Congress intended and not an oversight.68 
Further, and perhaps more troubling, the majority asserted it was 
more important that questions of fact—such as whether T.C.’s 
condition rendered her physically incapable—go to the jury.69 The 
majority’s rationale is disconcerting because allowing a jury to fact-
find and to determine guilt based upon an unclearly defined legal 
standard runs contrary to the law.70 The majority reasoned that they 
should follow cases that used the broader, more encompassing phrase 
(“physically incapable”) rather than the narrower phrase (“physically 
helpless”) because it would allow more cases to be submitted to the 
“good judgment of a jury.”71 
Applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard72 to the facts of this 
case, the majority held that the evidence produced by the government 
was sufficient to establish that T.C.—despite being able to 
communicate nonverbally—was physically incapable of 
communicating her willingness to engage in the sexual act and 
physically incapable of declining participation in the sexual act.73 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
James’s broadened interpretation of the meaning of “physically 
 
 66. Id. at 681. 
 67. Id. at 679. 
 68. See id. (“Noticeably absent from 18 U.S.C. § 2242 is a provision punishing non-
consensual sexual intercourse.”). 
 69. Id. at 681. 
 70. Id. at 684 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“The function of the jury is to find facts and 
determine guilt by applying known legal standards, not to make up the law as it goes along. The 
majority’s ‘let the jury decide what’s illegal’ approach is unwise and, most likely, 
unconstitutional.”). 
 71. Id. at 682 (majority opinion). 
 72. 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979) (noting that the Jackson standard for reviewing the 
sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction is articulated as: “[A]fter viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 73. James, 810 F.3d at 6828–30; see supra Part II. 
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incapable” under § 2242(2)(B) is likely to have significant 
ramifications on future cases involving a victim’s communicative 
capabilities in a sexual assault case that falls under federal law. The 
majority’s holding is the result of improper judicial overreach into 
Congress’s role of lawmaking. Procedurally, James also reflects on 
the importance of the government’s charge for a criminal defendant74 
and the necessity of jurors applying an established legal standard to 
the facts of a case. Further, James’s holding disregards the principle 
of statutory interpretation and the rule of lenity. 
A.  The Majority’s Justifications Are Based on an Unsteady 
Foundation 
The Ninth Circuit’s broadened definition of a “physically 
incapable” sexual assault victim overreaches its judicial boundaries 
and confers superfluous interpretation to a statute with a clear and 
plain meaning. Judge Alex Kozinski, the dissenting judge, stated this 
point well. Judge Kozinski recognized the statute’s clear meaning: 
“The government must prove that the alleged victim had a physical 
impairment and that this impairment made it impossible for [the 
alleged victim] to say no to . . . or to otherwise indicate nonconsent 
to sexual acts.”75 He also criticized the majority for overstepping its 
boundaries and filling in the gaps created by the language in the 
federal statute—a task that is for Congress, not the judiciary.76 
Further, Judge Kozinski responded to the majority’s point regarding 
the fact-finding function of the jury by urging that the jury must 
determine guilt by applying established legal standards, not to “make 
up the law as it goes along.”77 
Here, the evidence produced at trial indicated that T.C. was able 
to communicate: witnesses including the BIA agent, T.C.’s longtime 
caregiver, and T.C.’s uncle testified that she “can say yes or no,” 
“communicates by nodding or shaking her head and making grunting 
 
 74. See James, 810 F.3d at 686 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). A person with cerebral palsy will 
likely have both mental and physical incapacities, but the government in this case charged James 
under § 2242(2)(B), which involves a victim’s physical incapability. Id. The government did not 
charge James under § 2242(2)(A), which involves a victim’s mental incapability. This is 
important because evidence as to T.C.’s mental incapability—“mental limitations, developmental 
delay, and lack of knowledge about sex”—cannot justify James’s conviction under § 2242(2)(B). 
Id. 
 75. Id. at 684. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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sounds,” and “responds to questions by nodding her head for yes and 
shaking her head for no.”78 Although her means were unconventional 
and mostly nonverbal,79 witness testimony and the government 
counsel’s own opening statement all indicated that T.C. was able to 
physically communicate.80 
Particularly with individuals with cerebral palsy, the range of 
communication is wide.81 Individuals with cerebral palsy are 
sometimes unable to use speech and, as a result, alternate methods of 
communication are necessary.82 In fact, most people with cerebral 
palsy are able to communicate even if they are primarily nonverbal.83 
The majority’s opinion disregards the recognized ability of 
individuals with cerebral palsy to communicate in a nonverbal 
manner. In contrast with the district court, the majority found that the 
evidence produced at trial was sufficient to permit a rational juror to 
find that T.C.’s cerebral palsy was so severe that it rendered her 
incapable of being understood by others and, therefore, incapable of 
communicating to James her unwillingness to participate in the 
sexual act.84 
The majority’s reasoning, however, misses the central point. 
Section 2242(2)(B) requires the alleged victim to be physically 
unable to communicate dissent to participate in the sexual act, and 
 
 78. Id. at 685; see supra Part II. 
 79. James, 810 F.3d at 686 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). But see Reply Brief of Appellant at 4, 
United States v. James, 810 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 11-8206) (noting that “T.C.’s physical 
manifestations were not always consistent with her emotions” and that even when T.C. nodded 
her head “yes” or “no,” her actions were always in response to a question and were not always 
accurate). 
 80. James, 810 F.3d at 686 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. James, No. CR-
11-8206, 2013 WL 5423979, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2013), rev’d and vacated, 810 F.3d 674 
(9th Cir. 2016)); see Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 31, at 13:10–11. 
 81. What Is Cerebral Palsy?, CEREBRAL PALSY ALLIANCE, http://www.cerebralpalsy.org. 
au/what-is-cerebral-palsy (last visited July 23, 2016) (“Cerebral palsy is a physical disability that 
affects movement and posture . . . [It] affects people in different ways . . . People who have 
cerebral palsy may also have visual, learning, hearing, speech, epilepsy, and intellectual 
impairments.”). 
 82. Communication, MYCHILD, http://www.cerebralpalsy.org/information/communication 
(last visited July 23, 2016). 
 83. Id.; see Speech and Language Therapy, MYCHILD, http://www.cerebralpalsy.org/about-
cerebral-palsy/treatment/therapy/speech-language-therapy (last visited July 23, 2016) (indicating 
gestures, symbols, signing, touch, picture boards, computer-based aids, and voice synthesizers are 
tools to assist individuals with cerebral palsy in communicating); Cerebral Palsy and 
Communication, CEREBRAL PALSY SOURCE, http://www.cerebralpalsysource.com/About_CP/ 
communication_cp/index.html (last visited July 23, 2016) (“Communication is a very important 
tool for someone with cerebral palsy trying to express them self [sic].”). 
 84. James, 810 F.3d at 682. 
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the evidence at trial showed that T.C. was physically able to 
communicate her needs and desires, despite her methods of 
communication in a non-traditional manner.85 For that reason, it is 
troublesome to understand how the majority found that the evidence 
on the record supported a factual conclusion that T.C. was physically 
incapable of communicating. 
B.  The Majority Gave Short Shrift to Established Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Overreached Its Judicial Boundaries 
The majority attempted to justify its sweeping holding by 
reconciling it with the broader notion that the law should protect the 
weak and feeble.86 The majority used this concept as policy 
background to support its interpretation that a broader meaning of the 
“physically incapable” standard in § 2242(2)(B) was appropriate.87 
As a result, however, the majority’s holding missed its intended 
mark. The law should indeed aim to protect the weak and feeble 
from being taken advantage of in instances of sexual abuse, but at 
what cost? 
It is a historically fundamental principle of the American 
criminal justice system that “[t]he Constitution protects a criminal 
defendant from being convicted [of a particular charge] except on 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”88 Here, the government charged 
James for non-aggravated sexual abuse under § 2242(2)(B) rather 
than § 2242(2)(A), the “mental incapacity” subsection.89 Under the 
facts of the case, it seems as if subsection (A) of the statute would be 
a more appropriate charge.90 Even if the evidence at trial would have 
established that T.C. did not possess the mental capacity to appraise 
the nature of the sexual act with James, the presumption that T.C.’s 
limitations were purely physical must stand because the government 
 
 85. See supra Part II (noting that T.C.’s caregiver testified that T.C. is able to communicate 
when she wants to do something and when she does not want to do something). 
 86. James, 810 F.3d at 683. 
 87. See id. 
 88. 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 502 (4th ed., 2009); see Miles v. 
United States, 103 U.S. 304, 309 (1880). 
 89. James, 810 F.3d at 678–79. 
 90. Section 2242(2)(A) criminalizes those who “knowingly . . . engage in a sexual act with 
another person if that other person is incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct . . . .” 18 
U.S.C. § 2242(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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did not charge James under § 2242(2)(A).91 T.C. may or may not 
have been mentally capable of appraising the nature of James’s 
sexual conduct, but through witness testimony, the evidence shows 
that she was capable of physically expressing her emotions and 
otherwise communicating her intent to others.92 
Also, significantly, the government did not elicit testimony from 
a witness who personally knew T.C. to establish that she was 
physically incapable of expressing refusal or disagreement.93 
Procedurally, James should not have been convicted under § 
2242(2)(B) unless substantively and beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
evidence presented at trial established that T.C. was physically 
incapable of communicating her unwillingness to engage in the 
sexual act. This Comment asserts that the government did not meet 
its burden in its case-in-chief, as both witness testimony and the 
government’s own counsel indicated that T.C. was physically 
capable of communicating.94 
Moreover, the judiciary overstepped its boundaries by 
interpreting the “physically incapable” standard in a completely 
distinguishable manner than how states have interpreted their 
respective rape statutes. Congress passed § 2242(2) as part of the 
Sexual Abuse Act of 198695 in recognition that the antiquated federal 
laws regarding sexual abuse criminalized different conduct than the 
modernized state law equivalents.96 In effect, this would particularly 
be of concern for Indian Country jurisdictions, in which federal law, 
not state law, governs sexual assault crimes.97 The majority 
dismissed the legislative concern when it simply stated, “[R]elying 
on state law as the district court did is problematic.”98 The majority’s 
weak justification99 for its departure from established state law that 
addresses the same issue fails to consider the effect its interpretation 
would have in deepening this rift between state and federal law 
 
 91. James, 810 F.3d at 686 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 92. See supra Part II. 
 93. James, 810 F.3d at 686 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Although the nurse examiner who 
treated T.C. after the sexual act testified that T.C. could not respond to her questions, this 
testimony is not dispositive towards the point that T.C. could not physically communicate. Id. 
 94. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 31, at 13:10–11. 
 95. United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 96. Id. at 772; see supra note 17. 
 97. Bruguier, 735 F.3d at 772; see supra note 16. 
 98. James, 810 F.3d at 679. 
 99. See supra Part III(B). 
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statutes for the same or similar crime. 
Finally, in criminal cases where the statutory interpretation is 
ambiguous, the rule of lenity mandates that all doubts must be 
resolved in favor of the defendant.100 Not only does the majority 
neglect to address this important principle, but its opinion also stands 
the rule of lenity “on its head.”101 The rule of lenity requires that a 
criminal defendant has fair warning of the criminality of his or her 
conduct, and when there is a question of statutory interpretation, he 
or she cannot be punished for it.102 Because the very crux of the issue 
in James was the definition and scope of the words “physically 
incapable of declining participation in, or communicating 
unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act,”103 the majority should 
have applied the rule of lenity and resolved all doubts as to what the 
statute criminalized in favor of James. As it stands, James had no fair 
warning that his conduct would violate § 2242(2)(B); it was not 
apparently obvious that a woman with cerebral palsy, who was 
arguably unable to verbally communicate, was “physically 
incapable” of communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual 
act. 
V.  IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JAMES 
In effect, the majority’s holding goes beyond the scope of the 
instant case and will likely result in serious consequences for 
disabled individuals. The majority’s opinion advances existing 
stereotypes of the disabled community and deepens the divide 
between non-disabled and disabled persons. It also fails to account 
for the wide variety of physical and mental impairments amongst 
individuals and, further, it may have the effect of stifling future 
consensual sexual opportunities for disabled and impaired persons. 
Studies have shown that women with disabilities are 
stereotypically perceived as having a vulnerability factor. This 
vulnerability factor includes beliefs that “women with disabilities are 
 
 100. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
 101. James, 810 F.3d at 684 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 102. See United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917) (“that before a man can be 
punished as a criminal under the Federal law his case must be ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within 
the provisions of some statute . . . .”). 
 103. James, 810 F.3d at 679 (“This case turns on the breadth of the “physically incapable” 
standard in § 2242(2)(B) . . . .”). 
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asexual, passive, unaware, and therefore, easy prey.”104 Moreover, 
many women with disabilities have experienced generally “negative 
stereotypes and barriers to understanding and nurturing their 
womanhood.”105 The notion that women with disabilities may be 
perceived as vulnerable individuals does not mean that all sexual 
contact should be assumed to be unwarranted.106 In fact, people with 
disabilities experience sexual “wants and needs similar to their able-
bodied counterparts.”107 
Although the majority states that its holding “does not preclude 
someone suffering from physical disability from ever having 
consensual sexual intercourse,”108 its practical effect may do just 
that.109 In addressing this point, Judge Kozinski stated, “James will 
go to prison, likely for many years, because he had sex with someone 
whose physical handicap impaired her ability to communicate, even 
though those who knew her testified that she could physically convey 
the idea of ‘no’ when she wanted to.”110 This Comment suggests that 
by enacting its broad holding, the majority further limited the sexual 
liberty of impaired and disabled individuals and overstepped its 
boundaries in doing so. Preventing all sexual pleasure and intimacy 
in the name of protecting the vulnerable is a violation of a person’s 
basic rights.111 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is not yet certain how James will affect future federal sexual 
abuse cases where the victim is an impaired individual with some 
physical and mental limitations. Both federal and state case law 
interpreting the language “physically incapable” or “physically 
 
 104. Margaret A. Nosek et al., Vulnerabilities for Abuse Among Women with Disabilities, 19 
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 177, 178 (2001). 
 105. M.A. Nosek et al., National Study of Women and Physical Disabilities: Final Report, 19 
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 5, 6 (2001). 
 106. Jacob M. Appel, Sex Rights for the Disabled?, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 152, 153 (2010). This 
is not to say, however, that vulnerable individuals should not be protected from unwarranted 
contact. Id. 
 107. Shanna K. Kattari, Sexual Experiences of Adults with Physical Disabilities: Negotiating 
with Sexual Partners, 34 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 499, 511 (2014). 
 108. James, 810 F.3d at 683. 
 109. See id. at 687 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion will make others more reticent 
about engaging in sex with people who are physically impaired. Their already difficult task of 
seeking out a partner for sexual gratification will become even more daunting.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Appel, supra note 106, at 153. 
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helpless,” respectively, is scarce or non-existent. By overstepping its 
judicial boundaries and broadening a previously clear definition of a 
victim who is “physically incapable” of communicating and 
declining participation in a sexual act, the majority sought to cast a 
wide net to catch sexual offenders without regard to the 
government’s criminal charge and, thereby, resisted the rule of 
lenity. The majority’s effort appears virtuous on its face, but in 
effect, will likely pose alarming results for the disabled community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
